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Introduction
 Regional cooperation and integration brings countries from a region 
together in the joint pursuit of coordinated policy-making and shared 
jurisdiction. In Europe, five decades of regional integration led to the 
establishment of an exceptionally sophisticated regional organization ? the 
European Union ?Moravcsik, ?????. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN not only 
developed a set of regional norms known as the ?ASEAN Way?, but played a 
key role in mitigating potential conflicts in the region ?Acharya, ?????. 
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Abstract
 To trace leadership in regional cooperation and integration is a difficult task. In 
Europe, the Franco-German partnership has long been considered an important, but 
gradually waning, driving force behind the European Union. In East Asia, whether China, 
Japan or ASEAN led regional cooperation remains a controversial topic. This paper argues 
that the focus on individual countries fails to appreciate the leadership role in a dynamic 
regional integration process. From a functional perspective, three factors are essential to 
multilateral regional cooperation: public goods provision, institutional engineering and 
participation incentives. These functional factors also offer a useful benchmark to assess 
leadership in regional cooperative schemes. The paper shows that regionalism in East 
and Southeast Asia witnessed a form of multi-country functional leadership between 
???? and ????: the growing willingness of Japan?s material contribution, the increasing 
importance of ASEAN-led institutional infrastructure, and the important participating 
incentives resulting from China?s active engagement.
364
Min SHU? Leadership in Regional Cooperation and Integration: A Functional Approach to 
East and Southeast Asia ????-????
 While several theoretical arguments have been developed to explain 
the development of regional cooperation and integration, regional integration 
theories have been accused of being too Euro-centric ?Breslin et al., ?????. 
Indeed, regardless of their distinctive explanatory variables, neofunctionalism, 
intergovernmentalism and, to a less extent, constructivism pay almost no 
attention to regional cooperative schemes outside Europe ?Haas, ????; 
Moravcsik, ????; Howarth and Torfing, ?????. Factors such as the spill-over 
of supranational cooperation, bargaining at intergovernmental conferences, 
and the persuasion of integration norms turn out to be less useful in 
explaining the evolution of non-European regional cooperative schemes. 
 One of the main concerns about regional cooperation and integration 
outside Europe is leadership in regionalism. Admittedly, leadership is a 
loosely defined term which has been employed in several academic fields 
such as international politics, corporate governance, and the study of 
organizational behaviour. In regional cooperation and integration, leadership 
refers to the capacity to build regional institutions, and the capability to 
motivate individual countries to participate in joint policy-making and 
shared jurisdiction at the regional level. 
 In the European context, the Franco-German partnership has long 
been considered as playing a leadership role in the regional integration 
process ?e.g., Calleo and Staal, ?????. After the Second World War, a 
series of initiatives of Robert Schuman, then the French Foreign Minister, 
and Konrad Adenauer, then the German Chancellor, made possible the 
European Coal and Steel Community ?ECSC? in the ????s. As it turned 
out, the ECSC not only provided the institutional infrastructure of the 
later European Community, but also developed a sophisticated decision-
making mechanism that evolved into the so-called ?Community Method? 
which today prevails in the policy-making of the EU ?Majone, ?????. 
Moreover, the Franco-German partnership proved crucial at various stages of 
the European integration process. The creation of the European Monetary 
System in ????, the signing of the Single European Act in ????, and the 
eastward enlargement of the EU in ???? all witnessed the joint efforts of 
France and Germany. On the whole, there is little doubt that the Franco-
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German partnership has been leading European integration forward in the 
past five decades. 
 Based on European experiences, some scholars try to examine the 
interaction between political leadership and the evolution of regional 
cooperative schemes. Walter Mattli, for example, argues that being able to 
?accommodate the demands for functional integration? offers the key to 
understanding the leadership factor in regional cooperation and integration 
?Mattli, ????: ???. According to him, the supply condition of successful 
regional integration should be undisputed leadership provided by a leading 
country in the region. 
 However, such a country-based view on leadership in regional 
integration is not easily transferable to East and Southeast Asia. In Southeast 
Asia, Indonesia is the biggest country in the region. The country covers 
nearly ? million square kilometers and has about ??? million people. Yet, it 
has the lowest per capita income among the founding members of ASEAN. 
Its influence is further constrained by the fact that the Indonesian army has 
little capacity to operate beyond its borders ?Leifer, ?????. Beyond the sub-
region of Southeast Asia, China and Japan seem to stand a good chance of 
leading regional cooperation and integration in East and Southeast Asia. 
However, their potential influences have been viewed with skepticism 
because of China?s long-term dominance in the region and Japanese colonial 
activity prior to the Second World War.  
 In order to move beyond the country-based analysis derived from 
European experiences, this paper suggests an alternative approach to the 
leadership question. More specifically, it focuses on the functional properties 
of the leadership role in regional cooperation and integration in order 
to offer a more sophisticated analytical framework to tackle the regional 
variations outside Europe. The rest of the paper proceeds in the following 
way. The next section takes a close look at the functional dimensions of 
regional leadership. Then, the third section applies this functional approach 
to the regional cooperation and integration of East and Southeast Asia. The 
discussion highlights the institutional infrastructure built by ASEAN, the 
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regional public goods provided by Japan, and the participation incentives 
resulting from China?s active engagement. The final section summaries the 
discussion and concludes the paper. 
A Functional Approach to Leadership in Regional Integration
 Understanding leadership is a key question in organizational studies. 
In plain terms, leadership involves motivating members in the joint pursuit 
of organizational goals. There have been several influential theoretical 
explanations for the leadership role. The trait theory of leadership, for 
example, stresses the typical behavior and personalities associated with 
effective leadership ?see Kirkpatrick and Locke, ?????. Such traits usually 
involve the desire to lead, the ability to motivate, and certain personal 
attributes like integrity, honesty and self-confidence. Weberian charisma 
is often regarded as the essential and desirable trait of effective leadership 
?Weber, ?????. 
 By comparison, leadership style theory seeks to answer the question 
of how the organization context mediates the leadership effects ?see Blake 
and Mouton, ?????. In an organization of interdependence and joint tasks, 
team style leadership tends to be more effective. In a loosely connected 
organization, the so-called ?country club style? of leadership probably 
makes a better contribution to group solidarity. In a strictly task-oriented 
organization, an authoritarian style of leadership is more likely to generate 
efficient results. Put differently, the most effective style of leadership is 
contingent on the type of organization and the specific circumstances under 
which the organization operates. 
 Functional leadership offers another theoretical approach to examining 
how leadership occurs. Rather than focusing on the leader him/herself, 
the theory explores how leadership fulfills the leadership functions of the 
organization ?see Goodman, ?????. Such functions may involve monitoring 
the external environment, ensuring the provision of public goods, organizing 
subordinate activities, motivating group members, and establishing 
organizational rules. By examining how leadership works rather than who 
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the actual leader is, the functional theory of leadership offers a distinctive 
perspective on the operation of leadership in different organizational 
contexts. 
 The organizational theories of leadership are quite useful in the 
discussion of regional leadership. Regional cooperation and integration often 
lead to a new layer of public governance above the state level. Joint policy-
making and shared jurisdiction at the regional level requires an effective 
regional organization to coordinate the behavior and interests of individual 
member countries. From this perspective, leadership in regionalism can be 
understood as the capability of guiding the regional organization towards 
further economic integration, stable political coordination and deepened 
cultural exchange at the regional level. The trait theory, the style theory and 
the functional theory of leadership each provide a unique analytical angle to 
decode the leadership roles in regional cooperation and integration. 
 Like the trait theory?s emphasis on specific characteristics of the 
leader, effective leadership in regional integration has been attributed to the 
leading country?s physical properties ?e.g., population size and land mass?, 
economic strengths ?e.g., economic growth, trade volumes and financial 
influences?, and political will ?e.g., desire to lead the region?. The literature 
on the Franco-German partnership in European integration highlights these 
leadership traits ?see Parsons, ?????. The French ambition to lead post-
war Europe has been considered as one of the key factors motivating the 
country to promote regional integration in Western Europe. Meanwhile, 
the economic strength of Germany, especially the strong Deutsche Mark, 
is regarded as the key factor behind German-style management of the 
European Central Bank and the single currency. Nevertheless, though 
the Franco-German partnership displayed many desirable characteristics 
of regional leadership, the emphasis on the specific traits of leadership in 
regional integration limits their applicability in other regional cooperative 
schemes across the world. 
 As the leadership style theory points out, effective leadership depends 
crucially on the organizational context. Regional cooperative schemes 
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vary substantially across different parts of the world. European integration 
features a unified regional cooperative scheme ? the EU, a highly developed 
institutional mechanism, a sophisticated transnational legal framework, 
a dedicated group of supranational bureaucrats, as well as an increasingly 
multi-leveled governance structure. By contrast, regional cooperation in East 
and Southeast Asia is characterized by the existence of multiple sub-regional 
cooperative schemes ?such as ASEAN, the APEC, and the SCO?, respect 
for state sovereignty, the principle of non-interference, the lack of a solid 
institutional and legal framework, and prevalence of informal consultation 
and consensus ?Shu, ?????. Considering such contrasting organizational 
logic, it is doubtful whether the aforementioned leadership traits could play 
the same roles in different regional cooperative schemes. 
 In fact, the European traits of regional leadership have proved 
counterproductive in East and Southeast Asia. First of all, the physical 
properties of individual countries do not easily translate into political 
influence in regional affairs. In maritime Southeast Asia, Indonesia has the 
largest population and land mass. However, its GDP per capita is less than 
half that of Malaysia. On mainland Southeast Asia, Vietnam has the biggest 
population, but its economic development lags far behind that of Thailand. 
An imbalance of physical properties and economic prosperity to a large 
extent characterizes Southeast Asia. Under such circumstances, it is almost 
impossible to identify ?Franco-German? style leadership in this sub-region. 
Secondly, if China and Japan are taken into consideration in the broader 
regional framework of East and Southeast Asia, another uneasy situation 
appears. It is true that China has a huge population and vast territory, and 
that Japan continues to possess the most significant economy in East Asia. 
However, due to the bitter memories of external control once imposed by 
China and Japan, Southeast Asian countries are keenly alert to any signs of 
regional ambition on the part of these two countries. Because of this, the 
normally desirable traits of effective regional leadership ? physical strength 
and regional ambitions ? appear incompatible with one another in East and 
Southeast Asia. 
 If the trait theory of leadership is not easily transferable across different 
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regions, how can one understand leadership in regional integration from a 
comparative perspective? To answer this question, functional theory provides 
a better analytical framework than leadership style theory. Firstly, it is difficult 
to categorize the ?style? of regional cooperative schemes in different parts of 
the world. Although some regional cooperative schemes are economically-
oriented and others focus more on political trust-building and regional 
security, whether or not such orientations amount to stylish differences in 
regional integration remains unclear. Secondly, regional cooperation and 
integration evolves over time. Even the same regional cooperative scheme 
may have different foci and display different characteristics at each stage of 
its development. Therefore, rather than focusing on styles of leadership, it 
makes more theoretical sense to take a functional approach to examining the 
leadership effect in regional integration. 
 In the regional cooperation and integration process, three functional 
properties are essential to multilateral cooperation at the regional level: 
public goods provision, institutional engineering and participation incentives. 
First, the success of multilateral regional integration depends on the 
potential benefits that regional cooperation could bring about ?Fawcett and 
Hurrell, ????; Mattli, ?????. Such benefits may take the forms of improved 
economic prosperity, a stable regional security environment, and better 
cultural exchanges among countries in the region. How such regional public 
goods are provided within a regional framework is an essential functional 
property of regional cooperative schemes. Second, in addition to public goods 
provision, regional institutional engineering plays a vital role in consolidating 
regional cooperative schemes. Institutions not only have the effect of 
stabilizing the existing demarcation of powers, but also help to socialize the 
expectations of different actors in the joint pursuit of common goods ?Peters, 
?????. Recent studies show that regional institutions vary substantially 
across different regional cooperative schemes ?see Acharya and Johnston, 
?????. Such variations are closely correlated with the effectiveness of 
regional cooperation and integration. Better institutional engineering tends 
to produce more adaptive and forward-looking regional cooperative schemes. 
Third, successful regional cooperation and integration are also more likely to 
attract outsiders to take part in the regional project. When it was founded in 
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????, ASEAN only had five members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Today, the organization has successfully doubled 
the number of its member states, and spread across the whole Southeast 
Asian region, excepting the newly-founded Timor-Leste. Indeed, adequate 
participation incentives are another indispensable functional property of 
regional cooperation and integration. 
 How do these three essential functions of regional cooperative schemes 
play out in the regional cooperation of East and Southeast Asia? Is it 
possible to identify the functional leadership of regional integration in this 
particular regional context? In order to answer these two related questions, 
the following section will conduct a case study of the regional cooperation 
and integration process that unfolded in East and Southeast Asia after the 
financial crisis in ????. 
Functional Leadership in East and Southeast Asian 
Regionalism 1997-2009
 The East Asian financial crisis in ????-???? had a long-lasting 
impact on domestic economic and political dynamics in East and Southeast 
Asia. Economically, under the reconstruction programs imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund ?IMF?, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia and 
the Philippines were forced to undertake painful economic reforms in order 
to obtain the financial support of the IMF ?Wade and Veneroso, ?????. 
Politically, the crisis led to two contrasting trajectories of regime transition 
and regime preservation. The long-term reign of Suharto in Indonesia was 
eventually brought to an end by the crisis, whereas Mahathir managed to 
consolidate his power in Malaysia, partly through his anti-Western rhetoric 
after the crisis ?Pepinsky, ?????. 
 More importantly, the financial crisis has generated novel incentives 
for further regional cooperation and integration in East and Southeast 
Asia ?MacIntyre et al., ?????. As became apparent after the crisis, it 
was no longer viable to rely on extra-regional support to deal with intra-
regional vulnerability. Various regional initiatives were launched in the post-
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crisis period with the aim of coping with the new reality. Among them, 
the ASEAN plus Three Process, the Chiang Mai Initiative, and the later 
convened East Asian Summit have all led to closer ties between the countries 
in a broadly defined East and Southeast Asia. 
 No doubt, regional cooperation and integration have made substantial 
progress in East and Southeast Asia during the past decade. While the East 
Asian financial crisis in ????-???? was an important triggering event, how 
could one explain the leadership factor in post-crisis East and Southeast 
Asia? The literature has proposed several explanations, but these arguments 
are not always in line with each other. On the one hand, Acharya argues 
in a recent article that ?ASEAN?s influence and leadership over Asian 
institutions? should not be neglected when we consider East and Southeast 
Asian regional cooperation ?Acharya, ????, p. ???, emphasis in original?. 
On the other hand, Beeson contends that the regional balance of power and 
especially Sino-Japanese competition for influence in Southeast Asia have 
been the major driving forces behind East Asian regionalism ?Beeson, ????; 
see also Dent, ?????. 
 Admittedly, it is difficult to deny the merits of these contrasting 
arguments. Post-crisis regional cooperation in East and Southeast Asia took 
place in an extremely complex environment. The Southeast Asian countries 
became more aware of the importance of institution building in a multilateral 
regional framework. The rise of China has been shifting the balance of power 
in both Northeast and Southeast Asia. Japan also became increasingly alert 
to her waning economic influence in the region. Against this general context, 
I now turn to a functional analysis of leadership in East and Southeast Asian 
regionalism. 
The Institutional Infrastructure of ASEAN
 The East Asian financial crisis revealed two inherent weaknesses in 
the existing regional cooperative schemes of Southeast Asia. The first was 
the inadequacy of sub-regional economic integration in Southeast Asia. 
As early as ????, ASEAN leaders agreed to create an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area ?AFTA? at their fourth summit in Singapore. The initial step was a 
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Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation. 
Later, the schedule of trade liberalization for AFTA was accelerated and the 
scope of AFTA was expanded to market integration, investment and service 
liberalization. Yet, efforts toward sub-regional economic integration proved 
insufficient when facing the financial crisis in ????. At the time of the crisis, 
most ASEAN member states were too preoccupied by their own domestic 
economic problems to agree on region-wide measures to deal with the 
ramifications of the crisis ?Ruland, ?????. The dysfunction of the existing 
regional institutions made Southeast Asian countries realize that regional 
economic stability should build on a broad economic infrastructure, beyond 
the narrow focus on Southeast Asia. 
 The second weakness revealed by the financial crisis lies in the 
economic cooperative mechanism of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Forum ?APEC?. APEC was launched in Canberra, Australia in ????. By 
the end of ????, APEC had evolved into a huge economic forum with ?? 
members ?including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, 
and the US? across the Pacific Rim. Despite its economic strength on the 
surface, APEC has been weakened over the years due to disagreement 
between Japan and the US over its development ?Aggarwal and Koo, ?????. 
When the financial crisis struck East and Southeast Asia, APEC was 
incapable of making any efforts to reduce the risk-averse behavior of overseas 
investors in the region. Apparently, if AFTA was too small to be effective, 
APEC was too big to generate meaningful policy outcomes. 
 It was against this background that Mahathir?s early proposal of the 
East Asian Economic Caucus ?EAEC? gained support in the region. In 
December ????, the first summit meeting of ASEAN members with China, 
Japan and South Korea ?APT, or ASEAN plus Three? was held to discuss 
collective responses to the financial crisis. The second APT meeting set up 
an East Asia Vision Group ?EAVG? in ???? with the aim of producing an 
expert report on a future ?East Asian Community?. The summit meeting 
also developed into a comprehensive forum covering economic, political 
and security issues in the region. At the third summit in ????, the leaders 
of ASEAN countries and China, Japan and South Korea issued a Joint 
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Statement on East Asian Cooperation, paving the way for comprehensive 
regional cooperation in both socio-economic and politico-security areas. As 
the APT process gained momentum, various ministerial level meetings were 
organized to deal with functional policy areas. For example, the first APT 
finance ministers meeting was held in April ????; the first APT economics 
ministers meeting was held in May ????; and the first APT foreign 
ministers meeting was held in July ????. As it turned out, these summits 
and ministerial meetings opened a new wave of regional cooperation and 
integration in East and Southeast Asia after the financial crisis ?Stubbs, 
?????. 
 The Chiang Mai Initiative ?CMI? was perhaps the most notable 
achievement of the APT process. At the second meeting of the APT 
financial ministers in May ????, it was agreed that a regional network of 
bilateral currency swap agreements would be set up to manage the potential 
risks resulting from speculative attacks or short-term liquidity crises. By 
the end of December ????, ?? bilateral swap agreements were concluded, 
the total amount of which stood at US$ ??.? billion ?Park and Wang, 
?????. In ???? it was further agreed that the ?? bilateral currency swap 
agreements would be pooled so as to establish a multilateral currency swap 
scheme covering the whole of the East and Southeast Asian region. This aim 
eventually realized in March ???? when a regional pool of foreign exchange 
reserves worth US$ ??? billion was established. 
 Building on the successful experience of the APT process, ASEAN 
launched another regional cooperative forum ? the East Asian Summit 
?EAS?? in ????. Dubbed also as ?ASEAN plus Six?, the EAS involves 
the ?? ASEAN member states together with China, Japan, South Korea 
plus Australia, New Zealand and India in a new institutional framework. 
The summit is held annually together with the ASEAN and APT meetings. 
Although the policies on the EAS agenda remained soft ?issues such as trade 
and energy?, the EAS has successfully brought new and powerful actors into 
the regional cooperative scheme. Initially, the three new members of the EAS 
were considered as a good counterbalance to the rising influence of China 
in the region. At the recent EAS meeting in ????, however, the Japanese 
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proposal of an ?East Asian Community? met with a counter-proposal by 
Australia which advocated an ?Asia-Pacific Community?. Despite such 
disagreement, ASEAN is standing firmly at the center of the newly formed 
institutional balance. 
 Another important multilateral institution in Southeast Asia is the 
ASEAN Regional Forum ?ARF?. The ARF was established in ???? to 
handle the changing security environment after the end of the Cold War 
in Southeast Asia. The main aim of the ARF is to foster constructive 
dialogue and consultation and to conduct confidence-building and 
preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Importantly, the first ARF 
meeting endorsed the purposes and principles of the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia ?TAC? as a code of conduct ?ASEAN, 
?????. The TAC is one of the founding documents of ASEAN. It not only 
guarantees mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, but also enshrines the ASEAN principles of non-interference and 
peaceful settlement of disputes. After almost one and a half decades, the 
ARF has become an important regional security forum. The Forum also 
managed to extend the TAC norms to its ?? members, which include China, 
Japan, Russia, the EU and the US.
 No doubt, ASEAN successfully built and extended a wide range of 
regional institutional frameworks to tackle the new regional order after the 
East Asian financial crisis in ????-????. This institutional infrastructure has 
turned into a key site of regional cooperation and integration in East and 
Southeast Asia. It is fair that say that ASEAN has been sitting in the driver?s 
seat, controlling the pace and direction of institutional development in East 
and Southeast Asia. 
Regional Public Goods provided by Japan
 As mentioned earlier, the East Asian financial crisis revealed the 
inadequacy of economic integration focusing exclusively on Southeast Asia. 
After all, with the exception of two small countries, Brunei and Singapore, 
most Southeast Asian states are developing countries struggling for economic 
growth and social development. Under these circumstances, it is hard to 
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rely exclusively on Southeast Asian countries to provide the public goods of 
regional cooperation and integration. 
 Japan has the second most significant economy in the world and 
the most significant economy in East Asia. Thanks to its economic 
strength, Japan has traditionally played an important role in the postwar 
economic development of Southeast Asia ?see Frankel and Kahler, ?????. 
For instance, between ???? and ???? Japan?s total Official Development 
Assistance ?ODA? increased five times, with Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand receiving roughly one third of all Japan?s bilateral 
donations ?Stubbs, ?????. Another factor also contributed to Japan?s active 
involvement in Southeast Asia. After Japan signed the Plaza Accord with the 
US in ????, the Japanese yen experienced rapid appreciation against the US 
dollar. In order to cope with rising domestic costs, many Japanese companies 
chose to invest heavily in Southeast Asian countries. During the period 
between ???? and ????, the foreign direct investment ?FDI? of Japanese 
companies in ASEAN countries amounted to more than US$?? billion 
?ASEAN Centre, ?????. One outcome of massive Japanese FDI has been 
a sophisticated production network centered on Japanese companies in the 
region ?Hatch and Yamamura, ?????. Based on these official and unofficial 
links, Japan was able to play a key part in providing public goods for East 
and Southeast Asian regionalism. 
 Immediately after the financial crisis in East Asia, Japan, together with 
South Korea, Thailand and some other Southeast Asian countries, proposed 
the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund ?AMF? in September ????. 
The original aims of the AMF were to supplement the IMF resources for 
crisis prevention and resolution and to deter further currency speculation 
in the region. Its resources would come from the pool of foreign exchange 
reserves of member economies. With the then biggest foreign reserves in 
East Asia, Japan?s proposal for an AMF was well received by crisis-ridden 
Southeast Asian countries like Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
However, the proposal met with strong opposition from the US and the 
IMF. Neither was China very enthusiastic about participating in the scheme. 
Eventually, the AMF proposal failed to win the necessary support. 
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 In spite of the failed attempt at an AMF, Japan quickly launched 
the ?New Miyazawa Initiative? in October ????. Through this package, 
Japan pledged US$ ?? billion to help East and Southeast Asian countries 
to overcome economic difficulties resulting from the financial crisis ?Kawai, 
?????. Half of the package was dedicated to short-term financial needs 
during the process of economic restructuring and reform, and the rest was 
offered for medium- and long-term reforms. The Miyazawa Initiative was 
widely regarded as key evidence that Japan was taking a leading regional 
role in East and Southeast Asia ?see Hughes, ?????. Indeed, the short-
term financial support provided to South Korea and Malaysia later became a 
model for bilateral currency swap arrangements under the CMI.
 In the recent gathering of the leaders of Japan and mainland ASEAN 
countries ? the Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting in November ????, 
Japan again promised to offer a substantial amount of financial assistance 
to development projects in the region. According to the Tokyo Declaration, 
Japan committed more than ??? billion Japanese Yen of ODA, over the next 
three years, for the Mekong river area ?MOFA, ?????. The ODA offered to 
Laos, for example, has a repayment period of ?? years and an interest rate of 
only ?.??% per annum. In his statement after the Mekong-Japan Summit, 
Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama claimed that the Mekong region is a key 
stepping stone towards the construction of an East Asian Community; Japan 
is committed to reducing poverty and bringing economic prosperity to this 
important sub-region. 
 The provision of public goods is an indispensable element of successful 
regional cooperation. In East and Southeast Asia, most countries are still 
in the early stages of domestic economic and social development. A lack of 
economic resources often impedes important cooperative initiatives in the 
region. It is in this particular respect that Japan has been both willing and 
able to play a leading role in providing regional public goods. By providing 
much needed development and economic assistance, Japan not only won 
the acclaim of neighboring countries, but also contributed substantially to 
regional cooperation in East and Southeast Asia.  
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China?s Engagement and Participation Incentives
 China is the biggest country in East Asia. It not only shares borders 
with key Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and 
the Philippines, but also maintains long-term influence over Southeast Asia. 
During the Cold War, communist China was regarded as a major security 
threat, which partly motivated the establishment of ASEAN in ????. The 
border disputes over the Paracel Islands between China and Vietnam and 
over the Spratly Islands between China and the Philippines have not made 
these bilateral relationships easier. However, after the ???? financial crisis in 
East Asia, China has followed a strategy of active engagement with Southeast 
Asia ?Shambaugh, ????; see also Kang, ?????. Though the shift of Chinese 
foreign policy towards Southeast Asia did not generate immediate results 
in the late ????s, its growing economic strength and political influence did 
make a noticeable difference to the regional cooperation and integration 
process of East and Southeast Asia in the following decade. 
 Because its capital account was not liberalized at the time of the East 
Asian financial crisis, China managed to survive the crisis without much 
direct damage. However, facing the large-scale depreciation of major East 
and Southeast Asian currencies, Chinese exports to the European and 
American markets were considerably disadvantaged after the crisis. Under 
these circumstances, China decided to uphold its promise not to devalue 
its own currency, avoiding the potential downward spiral of competitive 
devaluation in the region ?see Haggard, ?????. Furthermore, China chose to 
participate in the provision of economic assistance packages to Thailand and 
Indonesia immediately after the crisis. These ?responsible? efforts generated 
favorable perceptions of China in post-crisis East and Southeast Asia. 
 Nevertheless, China?s intention to join the World Trade Organization 
?WTO? brought additional fears to Southeast Asian countries over cheap 
Chinese products. In order to defuse such worries, China put forward the 
proposal of creating an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area ?ACFTA? in ????, 
the same year as China became a member of the WTO. The ACFTA came 
into force in ???? for six ASEAN members ?Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand?, and is intended to be extended 
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to the other four ASEAN countries in ????. An early harvest program 
dealing with trade in goods took effect as early as ????. In addition, the 
two sides signed the China-ASEAN agreement on trade in services in 
????; the China-ASEAN investment agreement was then agreed in ????. 
The economic impact of the proposed ACFTA has been significant. Total 
ASEAN-China trade has grown at a remarkable rate from under US$ ?? 
billion in ???? to over US$ ??? billion in ???? ASEAN Centre, ?????. 
 More importantly, the proposed ACFTA has motivated other East 
Asian countries to seek closer trade relationships with ASEAN. Afraid of 
losing influence to China, Japan and South Korea proposed similar free 
trade agreements with ASEAN in ???? and ????. In the Japanese case, the 
two sides signed a general framework for a bilateral free trade agreement in 
????. The bilateral trade negotiations started in April ????, and came to a 
conclusion in November ????. Eventually, the Japan-ASEAN Economic 
Partnership Agreement ?EPA? came into force in December ????. With 
South Korea, the FTA negotiations with ASEAN commenced in ???? and 
were concluded in the same year. The agreement took effect in July ????. In 
both cases, Japan and South Korea managed to exclude certain agricultural 
products from trade agreements with ASEAN. It is obvious that domestic 
opposition, particularly that from the agricultural sector, has long deterred 
Japan and South Korea from pursuing free trade deals with ASEAN. If 
China had not put forward the ACFTA in the first place, it would have been 
much more difficult for Japan and South Korea to take the ?brave? step of 
establishing closer trade relations with ASEAN. 
 The participation incentives resulting from China?s active engagement 
could also be identified in the case of the TAC. As mentioned above, the 
TAC enshrines the fundamental organization principles of ASEAN, such as 
respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and peaceful settlement of regional 
disputes. Signing the TAC is therefore considered to be a precondition for 
joining the East Asian Summit. Originally, apart from the Pacific state of 
Papua New Guinea, only ASEAN countries are signatory members of the 
TAC. China decided to sign the TAC in ????, and became the first non-
Southeast Asian country to do so. The following year soon witnessed the 
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signatures of Japan, South Korea and Russia. Then, Australia and New 
Zealand signed the TAC in ????. Despite a lack of enthusiasm to engage 
with the military junta in Myanmar, the US put its signature on the TAC 
in ???? to signal its ?return to Southeast Asia?. On the whole, it was not 
until China?s active engagement with Southeast Asia that the TAC began to 
attract the attention of so many other intra- and extra-regional powers. 
 In short, China?s policy towards East and Southeast Asia experienced 
a major shift during the East Asian financial crisis. From then on, China 
proposed a free trade area with ASEAN, signed the TAC, and participated in 
the ARF ?Shambaugh, ?????. Perhaps of more importance is the fact that 
the active engagement of China has generated unprecedented incentives to 
participate in East and Southeast Asian regional cooperation. Both Japan and 
South Korea followed in the footsteps of China to establish a closer trade 
relationship with ASEAN, and put their signatures on the TAC. Moreover, 
some extra-regional countries like Australia, India, Russia and the US also 
started to pay more serious attention to regional cooperation and integration 
in East and Southeast Asia. 
Conclusion
 In the past decade East and Southeast Asia witnessed closer regional 
cooperation and deeper regional integration. The East Asian financial 
crisis in ????-???? not only woke Southeast Asian countries up to the 
inadequacy of sub-regional economic integration, but also alerted them to 
the insufficiency of the grand Asia-Pacific economic forum. Learning from 
these lessons, regional cooperation in East and Southeast Asia has been 
increasingly taking the form of an ?ASEAN Plus? structure in the post-
crisis era. On the one hand, these regional initiatives relied on the existing 
institutional frameworks of ASEAN. On the other hand, ASEAN actively 
sought the participation and support of non-Southeast Asian countries in 
the newly formed regional institutions. Ten years later, the ?ASEAN Plus? 
strategy has proved to be fairly successful in mitigating intra-ASEAN 
disagreements and mobilizing extra-ASEAN countries within a broad 
regional framework. 
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 Notwithstanding the successes of the past decade, leadership in 
East and Southeast Asian regionalism remains an open question in both 
academic and policy circles. In most cases, commentators and practitioners 
point to the Franco-German partnership in Europe for possible guidance 
on how to answer the leadership question in East and Southeast Asia. 
Some maintain that ASEAN is playing the key role in moving forward the 
regional integration process of East and Southeast Asia ?Acharya, ?????. 
Others contend that China and Japan have been competing for leadership 
in pushing regional cooperation and integration ?Beeson, ????; Dent, 
?????. Still others look into the hierarchical power structure in East Asia for 
possible clues to regional leadership ?Kang, ?????. 
 This paper argues that country-based views fail to shed light on the 
leadership question in the dynamic development of East and Southeast Asian 
regionalism. In East and Southeast Asia, big countries are often constrained 
by a lack of economic strength ?e.g. Indonesia?, a lack of mutual trust ?e.g., 
China?, or historical animosity ?e.g., Japan?. In other words, the desirable 
traits of effective leadership do not come together in a single country in East 
and Southeast Asian regionalism. Instead of focusing on specific countries, it 
makes more theoretical and empirical sense to adopt a functional approach 
to examining regional leadership in East and Southeast Asia. 
 If successful regional cooperative schemes depend on three key 
functional properties: public goods provision, institutional engineering 
and participation incentives, it is then possible to identify a multi-country 
functional leadership in post-crisis East and Southeast Asia. More 
specifically, ASEAN has built an essential institutional infrastructure for 
East and Southeast Asian regionalism: the APT Process, the EAS and 
the ARF; Japan has been willing to provide crucial regional public goods 
to reduce regional economic inequality and stimulate regional economic 
growth; China?s active engagement not only placed it at the forefront of East 
and Southeast Asian regionalism, but also generated crucial participating 
incentives to bring other countries from the region on board. Put together, 
ASEAN, Japan and China have been playing a joint leadership role in the 
regional cooperation and integration process of East and Southeast Asia. 
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 Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the current constellation 
of functional leadership in East and Southeast Asia is not necessarily a 
stable equilibrium in the long run. As the ?ASEAN Plus? strategy brings 
more countries into the regional cooperation and integration process, East 
and Southeast Asian regionalism is bound to take a new shape. During the 
???? EAS meeting in Thailand, for example, Japan and Australia clashed 
with each other over the proper shape of a future East Asian Community. 
Russia and the US are invited to join the EAS in ????. It is probable that 
disagreement over the proper shape of East and Southeast Asian regionalism 
may appear in the near future. Nonetheless, the functional approach to 
regional leadership will continue to offer a useful analytical perspective to 
decode the leadership role in East and Southeast Asian regional cooperation 
and integration. 
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